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Respondent's Brief makes evident the reason it asked the
United States District Court to remand this case, and then delayed
once it returned here:

Respondent apparently believes it can

persuade this Court to construct special new rules--of waiver,
non-retroactivity, and harmless error in capital sentencing--to
deny these two Petitioners, and them alone, the protections of the
sentencing standard announced in State v. wood.

In case it cannot,

Respondent has sponsored legislation which would permit
resentencing in capital cases, got it passed while this case was
pending, 1 and now asks the Court to create another exception,
specially for this case, and permit these two men to be resentenced
under that new statute.
Petitioner prays this Court will not be persuaded, with life
at stake, to carve out such ad hoc exceptions to the rule of law.
The size of Respondent's Brief should not be mistaken for
substance.

For all its length, it cites no authority anywhere that

contravenes the clear, controlling precedents Petitioner has
presented.

Its arguments are based on distortions of the facts,

and misconstruction of the law.

1 Respondent falsely says this case was brought after the
February 16, 1982 passage of SB 60. RP 85.
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I.

THE ISSUES HERE HAVE NEVER BEEN WAIVED.

Though it was at Respondent's insistence this Petition was
filed, its first argument now is that it should be dismissed.
Ignoring the facts of record in this Court, Respondent now says the
issues here have not been raised before, and are waived.
When Petitioner raised the burden of proof argument on direct
appeal, Respondent made no waiver claim, and this Court considered
and rejected it on its merits.

State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709, 710

(Utah 1977)1 see Brief of Respondent, State v. Andrews No. 13902 at
12. 2

when Petitioner again challenged the burden of proof at

sentencing in his Postconviction Petition, Respondent said his
"arguments [were] ••• very similar as to the direct appeal" and
should be rejected for that reason.

See Transcript of Proceedings,

Andrews v. Morris, Third District No. C-78-7126, attached as
Appendix A-1.

The District Court so found and dismissed, and on

appeal from that dismissal this Court agreed: "the standard of
proof issue was raised on direct appeal in Pierre• and the
Postconviction Petitions "simply reframed the same issues.•

Pierre

v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 814, 813 (Utah 1980)1 accord Andrews v.

2 petitioner has not attached copies of documents previously
filed by the parties in this case in this Court, because he assumes
they are part of the Court's records. Of course, he will supply
them on request.
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Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 and n.9 (Utah 1980).3
Respondent now asks this Court to reverse itself, rewrite this
history, and hold this claim has somehow been waived--not because
of any rule of procedure violated by Petitioner's court-appointed
counsel, but because of minor differences in the specific terms of
the burden of proof arguments in Pierre and wood.
Certainly, the Pierre argument Petitioner adopted was not
directed specifically at the relative weight of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, because it was "in that case (State v.
Pierre) the court first established that the burden of proof in
capital cases is that 'the totality of aggravating circumstances
must ••• outweigh the totality of mitigating circumstances.'"
Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Rehearing at 21, Andrews v.
Morris, No. 16168.

Despite that--and despite the fact that "[t]he

signals from ••• [the Supreme] Court have not

always been easy

to decipher," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978), so "there
has developed a great deal of consternation and confusion about the
death penalty," State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah 1977)--

3 As Respondent notes, Pierre and Andrews took different
approaches in their postconviction appeals. Andrews' arguments
focused on intervening changes in the case law and governing
constitutional principles, not the merits of the various issues his
petition raised. Andrews v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 822-24.
Several of the cases he cited formed the basis of the decision in
State v. wood. See id. at 11-15. Pierre's postconviction argument
went directly to the-i:iurden of proof issue in the same terms it was
decided in wood. Pierre v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 814-15; see
Resp.Br. at--,-0:- Neither approach succeeded.
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Pierre's burden of proof argument more closely approximated the
decision in Wood than did Wood's argument itself.4

Even more

importantly--though Respondent neglects to mention it--the Court in
Pierre, and in Andrews, plainly understood and addressed that
argument in its most general terms.

See Pet.Br. at 2.

At all times before this Court, Petitioner has attempted to
abide by its rules and couch his arguments in terms consistent with
the law of this state.

No issue has ever been deliberately

withheld or "sandbagged" in this case.5

The burden of proof

issue was raised in the clearest terms possible, and fully
considered, on the direct appeal.
II.

There has been no waiver here.

NO AUTHORITY SUPPORTS RESPONDENT'S NON-RETROACTIVITY ARGUMENT.
The single, dispositive question here is whether the rule of

wood should be given limited, prospective application, contrary to
the general rule that judicial interpretations of the law are
retroactive.

For all its verbiage and scattershot case citations,

4 Respondent falsely says Wood couched his argument in the same
terms this Court decided it. Resp.Br. at 34. In fact, Wood
challenged the Utah statute for "failing to require proof of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt• and argued
"the state should bear the burden of proving that the aggra~ating
circumstances are of such proportion that the mitigating
circumstances do not constitute a reasonable or substantial doubt
on the question of imposing a sentence of death." Brief of
Appellant at 20, 23, State v. Wood, No.16486 (Appendix B).
5 Respondent's constant attempts to label virtually anything
counsel does as a waiver for which Petitioner should pay with his
life (e.g., Resp.Br. at 25n.11) are as baseless as they are
vicious. If the Court has any doubt of this, Petitioner would ask
for the opportunity to establish it at a hearing.
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Respondent gives no sound reason such an exception should be made
here, and points to no case anywhere which has so limited a
decision changing the burden of proof in a criminal case.
A9 Respondent's inability to find a contrary example confirms,
burden of proof decisions are universally held retroactive.

And

because such decisions relate to the truth-finding function, they
are retroactive regardless of any reliance or their impact on the
administration of justice.
"Neither good-faith reliance by the state or federal
authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of
justice has sufficed to require prospective application
in these circumstances." Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646, 653, 28 L.Ed.2d 388, 91 s.ct. 1148 (1971) ••••
Ivan

v. v.

City of New York, 407 U.S. 202, 204-205 (1972).

The

same rule applies whether or not the burden of proof decision is
constitutionally compelled.

See, e.g., State v. Humphries, 364

N.E.2d 1354 (Ohio 1977), cited in Engle v. Isaac,
Cr.L. 3001, 3003 (April 5, 1982).

U.S.

, 31

Thus the Court n.eed not decide

in this case that issue, which it declined to reach in Wood. 6
If it did, Petitioner would argue that Wood's sentencing
standard is constitutionally required, at least under this statute,
for all the reasons given in the Pierre argument and in State v.
wood, supra, at 11-15.

But whether it is based in the constitution

or statutory interpretation, its retroactivity is required because

6 Respondent falsely suggests wood held.the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard was not constitutionally compelled. Resp.Br. at
21-23. In fact, the Court in~ clearly left that issue open.
See State v. wood, supra, at 13.
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it directly relates to the truth-finding function at the most
critical phase of the most serious kind of criminal trial.7
Even if the issue here did not involve the burden of proof,
there would be no valid reason here to depart from the general rule
of retroactivity.

Respondent has pointed to no considerations of

reliance or the affect on the administration of justice which would
justify giving Wood limited, prospective application.

Only one

death sentence has been imposed under jury instructions derived
from Pierre: that sentence, which is pending before the Court in
State v. Heber Norton, will have to be reversed under any accepted
retroactivity jurisprudence, because it is still on appeal.
The only affect of Wood's total retroactivity would be the
reversal of the two remaining death sentences imposed under a
different standard:

those of Petitioner and his co-defendant.

To

refuse to apply a uniform legal standard because of the impact of
reversing one case on "the administration of justice" would amount
to nothing more or less than judicial discrimination.
For our system of justice to command the respect of
society, the law must be applied, in all cases, in a
judicious and even-handed manner.
State v. wood, supra at 11.

Petitioner cannot believe this Court

will accept Respondent's invitation to forget that here.

7 Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1977) ~nvolved no similar
issues. See 387 so.2d at 924. Moreover, Witt appears to have been
overruled by Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds 50 u.s.L.W. 3981 (1982).
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III.

THE QUESTION OF HARMLESS ERROR.
Respondent appears to admit that errors in setting the burden

of proof at the guilt phase of trial cannot be harmless (Resp.Br.
at 70), but turns the constitution on its head by arguing such
errors in capital sentencing proceedings can.

At least, the

sentencing determination in a capital trial is entitled to no less
constitutional respect than a determination of guilt or innocence.
See Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1862 (1981).

The basic

protections of due process apply to death sentencing proceedings.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)1 State v. Wood, supra.
Like a guilt determination, a sentencing verdict cannot be affirmed
on appeal on a ground substantially different from that on which
the jury reached it.

Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978).

If there is any constitutional difference between these two
types of verdicts, it is that errors in death sentencing
proceedings are more serious than errors in guilt trials, not less.
Death in its finality, differs from life imprisonment more
than a hundred-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two. Because of that quantitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).

Moreover, the

necessarily subjective nature of the penalty determination makes it
i1apo8sible for a reviewing court to determine precisely what factor
tipped the balance.
The ultimate purpose in the penalty phase is not one of
fact finding, but the fixing.of a penalty, and the fixing
of a penalty is a matter of Judgment about what penal
consequences should attach to the commission of a capital
crime by a particular defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State v. Wood, supra, at 16.

No reviewing court can ever state

with certainty what the result would have been had that judgment
been instructed by wholly different standards.
Even if an error in setting a death sentencing standard could
be held harmless in some case, it could not be here.

No one else

has yet been sentenced to death under the wood standard, regardless
of the severity of aggravation or the paucity of mitigation.

There

is no principled way this Court can say William Andrews would have
been.

There is no way on this record this Court can know how many

of the statutory aggravating circumstances this jury found.a

And

despite Respondent's attempt to deny them, there clearly was
evidence from which the jury could have found at least four

8 contrary to Respondent's assertions (Resp.Br. at 3n.2), four of
the eight statutory aggravating circumstances listed in UCA
76-5-202 (§§ (a), (e), (g) and (h)) were supported by no evidence
whatsoever as to either defendant, and were not submitted by the
trial court. Several of those that were submitted were subject to
substantial doubt, at least as to Andrews. Certainly, there was no
evidence whatever William Andrews was engaged "in the commission of
••• rape" UCA 76-5-202(1)(d). Andrews clearly was gone before any
rape took place. T.Tr. 3184. There was also no evidence Andrews
himself "committed another homicide" (UCA 76-5-202(b)), though the
trial court expanded this aggravating circumstance in its "parties"
instruction. See Court's Instruction on Guilt, No. 8. The trial
court's theory of "personal gain" under UCA 76-5-202(1)(g) was
supported by evidence primarily relating to Pierre, not Andrews.
See ibid.7 T.Tr 3091. And any theory of 0 pecuniary gain" would
involve the same evidence as the aggravating circumstance of
robbery. That evidence, at most, could support one additional
aggravating factor. Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 (Fla.
1976), cert denied 431 U.S. 969 (1977); Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d
1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981), reversed on other grounds 50 u.s.L.W. 5087
(1982). Cf. State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1979).
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statutory mitigating circumstances9--and substantial nonstatutory mitigation as well.10
The jury deliberated on this sentence for over two hours.
T.Tr. 4304-6.

No one knows, or can know, what it believed, what it

rejected, and how it weighed the facts it found in reaching its
decision.

This is not a matter about which appellate courts can

simply speculate:

"the reasoning of the plurality opinion in

9 Even Respondent admits Andrews' criminal record was "not
extensive" (Resp.Br. at 4n.2). Andrews was 19 at the time of this
crime. Respondent's attempt to deny the jury could have found that
mitigating ignores the meaning of the word "youth", and the
constitutional prohibition against limiting its scope--and
contrasts sharply with the public pronouncements of the Attorney
General who prosecuted this appeal that John Michael Calhoun's
"tender age" of 18 1/2 should preclude his death sentence for the
cold blooded murder of two people. Salt Lake Tribune, April 18,
1980, B8:1.
Respondent's denial that Andrews' participation in these killings
was minor relative to Pierre's ignores the fact--conveniently
omitted from its summary of the evidence--that Andrews was not
present when any of the killings took place. T.Tr 3188. Its
denial that there was any evidence Andrews was dominated by Pierre
ignores the testimony of Orren Walker that Andrews "was disturbed
during the whole evening• (T.Tr. 3176-7), protested when Pierre
first fired his gun, apparently argued with Pierre, and was twice
heard to say "I can't do it, I'm scared." T.Tr. 3073, 3091, 3183.
There remains real doubt William Andrews' participation in this
crime was sufficient to support a death sentence. See Enmund v.
Florida, 50 u.s.L.W. 5087 (June 2, 1982). At the least, it was a
fact which was constitutionally required to be considered in
mitigation. See id. at 50 u.s.L.W. 5093ff (concurring opinion of
Justice O'Connor)-.10 Andrews' impoverished and deprived childhood and background
--which is undisputed and acknowledged even by Respondent's summary
of the facts--was a factor the jury was constitutionally required
to take into consideration in mitigation, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 50
u.s.L.W. 4161 (January 19, 1982), though it was not listed in the
statute.
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Lockett compels a reversal so ••• not [to] 'risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a
less severe penalty.'

438 U.S., at 605."

Eddings v. Oklahoma,

supra, 50 u.s.L.W. at 4165 (concurring opinion of Justice
O'Connor).
reversal.
IV.

The error in this sentencing instruction requires
See State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980).

TO CREATE UNIQUE LEGAL RULES FOR THIS CASE WOULD BE TO PERMIT
ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.
Respondent wholly misconstrues the discrimination claim made

here.

Petitioner has not--out of respect to this Court's rules--

reraised the same allegations of arbitrariness and discrimination
rejected in Andrews v. Morris, supra, 607 P.2d at 825.
here is more limited:

The claim

it is that the affirmance of the death

sentences in this case, under a sentencing standard different from
that applied in all others, would inject an additional element of
arbitrariness and discrimination into this case, and separately
violate the Constitution.
This claim is predictive1 but it is not general.

To single

out two men for special, unequal treatment under an unaltered
statute, would create an arbitrariness and an equal protection
denial not based on statistics, but on specific acts directed
toward those individuals.
(1~77).

See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282

The fact those same two men are the only two blacks

sentenced under this statute would raise a serious inference of
discrimination.
1982).

See Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (11th Cir.

But regardless of race, it would violate the Constitution

to "permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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imposed.•

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)(concurring

opinion of Justice Stewart).
Petitioner hopes and believes this Court will not permit that
and will reject Respondent's attempts to make special rules for
this case on their merits.

He raises this issue now only because

the rules of exhaustion--and the unyielding barrage of waiver
arguments he has been subjected to--force him to spell out all
constitutional objections he would have to a contrary result.

That

result, and this issue, should never be reached.
V.

THIS CASE CANNOT BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
The law in effect at the time of the trial in this case--like

the law in effect at the time of Walter Wood and Gerald Paul Brown
--did not provide for new sentencing proceedings on remand of a
capital case.

UCA 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1974).

While it delayed this

litigation, Respondent prevailed upon the legislature to pass a new
statute, which permits such resentencing on retrial.
at 85.

See Resp.Br.

That statute does not contain any express.declaration it

should be applied retroactively.

Under the law of this state, it

should have no effect on either this case or this petition, both of
which long preceded its effective date.

As Petitioner has

previously argued in his responding memorandum, to hold otherwise
would violate not only that clear state law, but the ex post facto
and bill of attainder clauses of the Constitution.

For all those

reasons, this last ditch effort to create yet another special set
of rules for this case should be rejected by this Court.
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VI.

CONCLUSION
This should not be a difficult case.

After careful and

extensive deliberation, for sound and humane reasons, this Court
has

i~terpreted

Utah's capital punishment statute to include a

sentencing standard appropriate to nthe gravity of the decision to
be made and the constitutional environment in which that decision
must be made."

State v. Wood, supra, at 14.

was not followed in William Andrews case.

That standard clearly

Andrews' counsel

challenged the standard that was applied on direct appeal.

William

Andrews should not be consigned to his death simply because that
appeal came too soon.
DATED this 1st day of October, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

Timothy K. Ford
Attorney for William Andrews
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As to 12-A, he said, again,

_, .. _

fairly represent.ing

3

the situation, that the arguccnts are very similar as to the ·

'

direct· appeaL ·· :;::.. ~ ~· .

5

·As to ·12-B, 'be talks about the pattem of impositic n

6

of the death penalty and endeavored to indicate that that was

7

·the reason that the Dunsdon case was continued and have had

8.

that matter already resolved. that that was not the reason:

9

·for that and I would point out with respect to the fact that

10

that's not a new issue, that on page eight of the Andrews'

.11

Amended Petition, unlike the Petition for Habeas Corpus in

12

Pierre which does not specifically set forth the time periods

13

but which obviously are applicable as

to both

cases, it reads

as follows:· "The pattern of imposition of· the death penalty
.15

in Utah and in the United States sinc·e the enactment in .July,

,16

1973, of the •tatutory system under which petitioner was

17

sentenced, shows that the sentence of death is being imposed

18

so rarely and arbitrarily and discriminatorily against the

.19

poor and .outcast whose alleged victi11B,are white, aa to

20

separately ·violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

21

ciples of Furman v. Georgia.

22

persons in Utah and hundreds of persons in the United States

.23.

have been

24

which would make them capital under the goveming State

_25

statutes;·'petitioner b

26

choaen randomly at best and discriminatorily at worst, who

I

~27'

~onvicted

30

Since .July, 1973, dozens of

of homicides committed under circumstancet

one of. the tiny minority· of these,

baa actually been sentenced to death as a result of such conl

29

prin~

t.

~...,.

..- . . . i ..

;

.... .

.. t

.t .. • •

....

~

'"". Now~. Your Honor, more than three years after the
time that this eo-called pattern began in July of 1973, these
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IN

nit DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT 1:AKE ~~OUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM ANDREWS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
ON ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR RABE.AS

v.

CORPUS

LAWRENCE MORRIS. Warden of
the

U~ah

St_ate Prison,

CASE NO. 78- 7126

Respondent.

In support of its order. dated November 30, 1978,

gr~nting

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition and denying the Motion
by Petitioner. for a stay of execution, the Court now makes the
following findings and con~lusions:

1.

No developments of fact or law material .to the

deter~

mination of the legality and.constitutionality of the conviction·•
and sentence of the Petitioner herein have occurred since the
filing of Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
and that Court's decision on that appeal.

2.

All the issues ·regarding the constitutionality of

the processes for death se!1tencing under Utah law., the constitution_alit:y of the death sentences in P_etitioner' s case, and the effect
of any alleged prejudicial publici.t:y Or.J:?!'!:.uerices. ·on PeJ:Jf-ione:r' s
. .
• .
.
,t·1 (/'1--.-</tl _t~ .. . A..P,~../)~ ~....?· ..
t=ial ~nich are raised by this Petition ,re the same issu~s th~t

Petitioner raised in his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Cou:t.·
---··
.
3. Petitioner's claim that Utah s. death penalty la~ ·
1

------

is being applied arbitrarily and d_iscriminatorily fails to stat:e.

... .

a clai:n on which relief could be granted or on ~hich a heari~~

•

zi.:t.1.~,:,<..(."c. ~. ,-:<..-f-/ ? ..,,.,, /'~.~:··~ _;..C~-c...N

need b,e peld, ?'Ht.'J..L-··X-L+ 1 ~ ~t.-:.:e..e r ~=-~,,.... /~ 7J~
~ &e..1--..i..d' ·""-'"-' ~ -~~-1:.,. /.----'
•
d
/"
4. Constitutional issues identical to those raise

a~~ ciec~ded on di~ect appeal cannot be raised again in collateral
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5.
plic~ion

Constitutional challenges to the pattern of ap-

of e criminal statute or the excessiveness of a criminal

sentence 'Which 'Were no1;· .but could have been raised on direct .
a;>peal c:a::mot be .raised
DATED:

thro~g~collateral

December

£,

proceedings.

.·.:•

. .

1978. ·

ATTEST.
·STERLING EVANS
lerk

·- ....

STATE O"' \ITAH ·
(.
CO\.'N':"V 01" ..._&.TI.AKE.(~

,, •.

1. Tt-<~ UNDGl'SIGNED. CLERK o;, THE 01sTRlCT
CO\JRT OF SALT s:..AK£ cou .. TY. UTAH. '00 ~t:,tE•~
CERTIFY TH"'T" THE ANNEXEl:I° AND F'OSS.t'C.i;ING ~·
A TJl\11£ AND F'UL.L. C:.OPV OF AN OP.ICINt,:., D()CU ••
MENTON F-11.. E·u· MV
As sucH CLE'PIK.
WITNE'SS -MY .HAND~ a£AL. OF SAID ·~"T

·o,.,.•e&

TMIS

~y .Of! -~ ~

W. 5TEFI ING
WY

r:tl~'":,'*'C/"-~ ••·

-~

"

~

_.st~·

·• . .

••

DE~~
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to--issue· a·-.cautionary·instruction, although not requested to do so.
Johann had an obvious motive to color his testimony
against appellant so as to assure favorable treatment for
himself and avoid exposure to the death penalty.

The signifi-

cance of his testimony against appellant compelled a cautionary
instruction to the jury.

Johann was the state's chief witness,

the only one who claimed to witness the shooting.

His

credibility was a crucial issue.
Jury instructions must be construed as a whole.
(See State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (1977) and cases cited
therein)

In appellant's case, no instructions

were given

regarding intoxication, no cautionary instruction was given
and an instruction on flight was given where none was
warranted by the evidence.
On balance, the instructions were inadequate, misleading and weighted in favor of the prosecution.

That, in

conjunction with the Court's restriction on appellant's
direct testimony left the jury little alternative but to convict for first degree murder.

Thus, a reversal and remand

for a new trial is appropriate.
POINT V
THE UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING
STATUTE, SECTION 76-3-207,
u.c.A., DENIED APPELLANT DUE
PROCESS BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN
OF PROOF TO APPELLANT.AND BY
FAILING TO REQUIRE PROOF OF
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

-20-
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The Utah capital sentencing statute, as construed by
this Court in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), requires
only that the state prove " • • • that the totality of evidence
of ··aggravating circumstances must therefore outweigh · the
totality of mitigating

circumstances'~

in order to sustain a

verdict of death rather than life imprisonment.
As applied to appellant's case, such a rule effectively
eliminates the need for the state to produce any evidence of
aggravation at the penalty phase inasmuch as the aggravating
circumstances for purposes of the penalty phase are identical
to those which apply in the guilt phase.

In other words, the

state must already have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances
listed in Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated(l953), in order
to achieve a verdict of guilty as to first degree murder.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the burden of going
forward shifted to appellant .to raise mitigation and the burden
of proof shifted to appellant to produce sufficient mitigating
evidence so as to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Such a result is a clear violation of appellant's
right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the

Constitution of the United States and Article I,

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

(See also In re Winship,

397 U. S. 358, 25 L. Ed.2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421

u. s.

684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed.

2d 508 (1975})
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In Speiser v. Randall, 357

u. s.

513, 2 L •. Ed.2d

1460, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958), the Supreme Court reversed
California state judgments denying petitioners a property tax
exemption for refusal to sign a loyalty oath on their tax
returns.

The Court held that the statute requiring the oath

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof of non-involvement
in the proscribed advocacy to the taxpayer and violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
In considering the appropriate burden and standard
of proof applicable in a situation involving fundamental
rights, the Court stated:
There is always in litigation
a margin of error, representing error
in factfinding, which both parties
must take into account. 'Where one
party has at stake an interest of
transcending value--as a criminal
defendant his liberty--this margin
of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party
the burden of producing a sufficiency
of proof in the first instance, and
of persuading the factf inder at the
conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Due
process commands that no man shall
lose his liberty unless the Government
has borne the burden of producing the
evidence and convincing the fact finder
of his guilt. 357 u. s. at 525-526.
While acknowledging that Speiser v. Randall, supra,
dealt with free speech in a civil context, appellant asserts
that the concerns expressed in that case apply more forcefully to a criminal defendant who stands convicted of first
degree murder and who faces loss of his life, not the mere
loss
ofby thehis
liberty.
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The recent history of judicial authority in capital
cases in this country has been characterized by a continuing
concern by the appellate courts for narrowing the margin of
error in the application of the death penalty.
of all such cases since Furman v. Georgia, 408

The thrust

u. s.

238,

33 L. Ed.2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), has been to limit
and define those circumstances in which imposition of the
death penalty is appropriate and to ensure, as much as
possible, that the ultimate sanction will not be exacted·
arbitrarily or discriminatorily.
Appellant urges that the only proper standard of
proof to be applied to the penalty phase is that of beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Thus, the state should bear the burden of

proving that the aggravating circumstances are of such proportion that the mitigating circumstances do not consitute
a reasonable or substantial doubt on the question of imposing
a sentence of death.
While the Utah homicide statute provides a bifurcated
proceeding in capital felonies, it ought not to provide a
bifurcated standard of proof which substantially lessens
the burden to be borne by the state on the crucial issue of
the life or death of a criminal defendant.
In this instance, the trial court even evidenced a
belief that the proper standard should be beyond a reasonable
doubt, but noting that he must apply the preponderance
standard set forth in Pierre, supra.
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In the recent case of State v. Brown, (Utah Supreme
Court, No. 15481, filed February 7, 1980), Justice Stewart,
in an opinion concurring in the result, reasoned that Sections
76-1-501 and 502,

u. c.

A. (19?3), provide for the reasonable

doubt standard to be borne by the state as to every element
of a criminal offense, including the "attendant circumstances"
as well.

Thus, the language of those sections encompass the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the
commission of a homicide.

The Utah penalty hearing statute

does not rescind those general criminal provisions.
As presently drawn and construed, the Utah penalty
phase statute operates as a virtual mandatory death statute,
clearly in violation of the decision in Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.
(1976).

s.

280, 49 L. Ed.2d 944, 96

s.

Ct. 2978

The Utah penalty statute should be voided as both

facially overbroad and defective as applied.
Appellant contends that if this Court should reject
the reasonable doubt standard argued for herein, then it must
still find that the sentence of death in this case was
inappropriate even under the preponderance standard.

The

sole significant aggravating circumstance relied upon by_the
state was the dubious contention that the homicide was
conunitted in the course of a robbery.

The

rr~tigating

circum-

stances included the appellant's lack of any prior felony
record, his relatively young age (under 40), the fact that
he had been gainfully employed until a few months before the
homicide and that he suffered some degree of mental impairSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment or depression as a result of an extended alcohol problem.
Thus, the mitigating factors must surely have outweighed the
aggravating circumstances and warrant, at the very least,
a finding of prejudicial error as to the penalty proceeding.
POINT VI
UTAH'S CAPITAL SENTENCING STATUTES
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO
PROVIDE FOR THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE
REVIEW MANDATED BY DECISIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Section 76-3-206, U.C.A.

(1953), provides for auto-

matic review by the Utah Supreme Court of all cases where a
sentence of death has been imposed.

Section 76-3-20/(3)

allows for a revers.a:I.of the penalty phase where the Utah
Supreme Court finds prejudicial error in that proceeding.
Neither section defines the scope of review to be employed
by this Court in deciding the appropriateness of the penalty
imposed.

Nor is there any requirement of specific findings

in support of the penalty determination so as to provide an
adequate basis for review.
The

U~ited

States Supreme Court reviewed the Florida

capital sentencing procedures in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U. S.
242, 49 L. Ed.2d 913, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
statute provided, in

additio~

The Florida

to setting forth the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances to be considered, for mandatory
review by the Florida Supreme Court, requiring the Court to
compare the circumstances of the case before it with those
of other capital cases to determine the appropriateness of
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